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 I-1 Objectives and findings 
 
The strong empirical regularity observable worldwide is that, while low-income 
countries tend to tax agricultural producers, high-income countries tend to subsidize 
them. Food-exporting developing countries have commonly taxed their food exports by a 
variety of instruments. Thailand after the Second World War is a typical example of a 
food exporting developing country where the government reoriented its policies from 
taxing to subsidizing farmers as the economy moved from the low-income to the 
high-income stage. This study tries to analyze such reorientation of rice trade and 
pricing policies in Thailand after the Second World War based on a theoretical 
framework drawing on both standard neoclassical economic and political-economy or 
public-choice theories. The basic hypothesis is that the observed policy changes in 
Thailand were the product of interactions between politicians seeking to maximize the 
probability of staying in power and pressure groups lobbying for policies to maximize 
their welfare under the economic and institutional constraints. 
 
This hypothesis is examined by means of both a historical review of the rice trade 
and pricing policies in Thailand and a simulation analysis for 1950-85 using a partial 
equilibrium trade model of standard neoclassical economics. The historical review is 
focused on changes in the balance of power between agricultural and non-agricultural 
interest groups in the process of economic development involving changes in the 
institutional environment of Thailand. The simulation analysis aims to measure the 
efficiency and welfare distributional effects of the past rice policies in Thailand. 
 
Evidence from the historical review is consistent with the hypothesis. During the 
low-income stage, the Thai government taxed rice exports by various instruments to 
transfer income from politically-weak rice farmers to politically-strong urban 
consumers, business concerns, and government agencies. However, as the bargaining 
power shifted in favor of farmers when the economy advanced into the middle-income 
stage and the institutional environment changed from bureaucratic-centered to 
interest-group politics, the government reduced the taxation on rice exports gradually 
and began to institute policies in support of farmers aimed at preventing income 
disparities between the rural and the urban sectors and between the formal and the 
informal sectors from rising to such an extent as to trigger political instability and 
disruption. Also, politicians became eager to mobilize political support from rural 
constituencies under the more democratic regime from the mid-1970s. 
 
The simulation is conducted separately for the high-tax period (1950-70) and for the 
transitional period from the high-tax to the non-tax period (1971-85) in order to asses 
how the redistributional effects of the rice export taxation among interest groups 
changed as the economy advanced from the low-income to the middle-income stage. The 
choice of parameters used for the simulation analysis is based on a comprehensive 
survey of past econometric studies. The simulation results are found to be consistent 
with the political-economy hypothesis and the evidence from the historical review. 
During the 1950-70 high-tax period, the rice export taxation had the effects of 
redistributing substantial incomes from rice farmers to urban consumers, rice exporters, 
and the government. However, the amount of this income transfer from farmers by 
means of rice export taxation was reduced during the 1971-85 period of transition from 
the high-tax to the non-tax era. The quantitative data show that the Thai government 
overtaxed rice exports in terms of social welfare maximization criteria to the nation 
during the low-income stage and, later, reduced it to a more optimal level corresponding 
to both increases in per-capita income and the transition from bureaucratic-centered to 
interest-group politics. More recently, however, the government has reduced the 
taxation rate to less than optimum in terms of the social welfare maximization for the 
nation. This tax reduction reflects the shift in the political equilibrium from the point of 
favoring urban interests at the expense of farmers to that of favoring farmers. In this 
process, the economic welfare of the nation as a whole does not appear to have entered 
into politicians’ calculations as a significant factor in their policy decisions relative to 
their need to attract support from politically strong groups through income 
redistribution in their favor. 
 
The results of the analysis provide justifications for large food exporters like 
Thailand with respect to rice to tax their food exports at a high rate when they have no 
other source to raise sufficient funds for national development purposes during the 
low-income stage, and reduce the taxation rate as the countries advance to a higher 
development stage. However, the danger is that farmers may be taxed more heavily 
than the social optimum for a longer period than necessary due to the influence of the 
rent-seeking activities of politically powerful groups, while the government may lack 
the capacity to utilize the tax revenue efficiently for the development of the national 
economy including the rural sector. This danger is likely to be more pronounced in the 
case of small food-exporting developing countries unable to influence international 
market prices, such as Cambodia with respect to rice, because the export taxation 
invariably results in a net loss to the small country’s economic efficiency besides the 
creation of inter-sectoral inequality that is common to both large and small exporters. 
  
I-2 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows:  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
Chapter 3 Historical review of the rice economy and rice policies in Thailand 
Chapter 4 The simulation analysis 
Chapter 5 Summary and conclusion 
Bibliography 
 
Chapter 1 specifies the objectives and approaches of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework by means of literature reviews of 
political-economy or public-choice theories relevant to agricultural policies in 
comparison with standard classical and neoclassical economic theories relevant to the 
trade of agricultural commodities. Classical and neoclassical economic theories provide 
some theoretical justification for government interventions in agricultural commodity 
trades to correct market failures and to redistribute income in a more equitable manner. 
They, however, do not explain the pervasive government interventions in agricultural 
commodity trades observed worldwide and the choices of less efficient instruments. The 
literature applying the theories of public choice in the tradition of Downs (1957), Olson 
(1965) and others to agricultural policy studies argues that the observed policy 
outcomes are the results of the bargaining process of diverse interest groups and 
politicians pursuing their self-interest maximizations. Drawing on the conceptual 
framework of the public choice theories, hypotheses shall be postulated on the evolution 
of rice trade and pricing policies in Thailand after the Second World War. 
 
These hypotheses are examined in terms of a historical review of rice trade and 
pricing policies in Thailand after the Second World War in Chapter 3. Before presenting 
the historical evidence on the evolution of rice trade and pricing policies in the course of 
economic development, the chapter provides an overview of the economic growth and 
structural transformation, production and export of rice, and the institutional 
environment affecting the policy-making process in Thailand. The historical evidence is 
consistent with the political-economy hypotheses. During the low-income stage, the 
Thai government taxed rice exports by several instruments to transfer income from 
politically-weak rice farmers to politically-strong urban consumers, business concerns, 
and the government. However, as the economy advanced to the middle-income stage, 
the government reduced the taxation on rice exports gradually aimed at narrowing the 
income disparities between the rural and urban sectors and between the formal and 
informal sectors corresponding to the slower growth in agricultural productivity than 
industrial productivity and the emergence of the dual structure in the urban economy. 
 
Chapter 4 provides quantitative evidence to confirm these political-economy 
hypotheses by means of a simulation analysis on the distributional effect of rice export 
taxation in Thailand from 1950-85 among farmers, consumers, exporters, and the 
government or general taxpayers, using a partial equilibrium trade model of standard 
neoclassical economics. The simulation analysis is conducted for the 1950-70 high-tax 
period and the 1971-85 transitional period from the high-tax to non-tax period, and 
under the assumptions of both large- and small-country cases. The results show major 
changes in the pattern of income redistribution from the former to the latter period in a 
way consistent with inferences from the historical review. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the study and provides some policy implications for 
food-exporting developing countries and directions for future research. 
 
 





















































































もっと興味深い発見は、1950-70 年から 1971-85 年への輸出税の低下が農家に対する分配
上の公正化をもたらしたのみならず、タイのコメ輸出の減少を通じて、国際価格を上昇さ
せ、タイの社会的経済厚生の増大をまねいたとする結果である。ただし、1985 年以降、コ
メ輸出税が撤廃されたことは、農家を所得分配上でさらに有利化したものの、タイ全体と
しての経済厚生を低下させたと推定される。とすれば、経済成長に伴う農業政策の転換は、
国全体としての経済効率上昇を目指したものではなく、政治力が向上した農家の支持を得
ようとした政治家の政権維持指向によるものと判断される。 
 
なお、シミュレーション分析に用いた弾力性パラメーターは既存の推定値から選択した
ものであるが、その過程で関連する計量経済学分析の結果をほとんど完全にレビューして
おり、そこで用意されたパラメーター推定値のリストはそれ自体大変有用な貢献であると
いえよう。 
 
では、本論文のタイについての事例研究は国際開発政策にどのような示唆を与えるので
あろうか。恐らく最も重要な点は、タイのコメのように世界市場で大きなシェアを持ち、
その輸出の如何が国際価格に相当な影響を与えるような農産物を生産している途上国は、
その発展の初期において、この産品に輸出税を課すことによって、国全体としての経済厚
生を高めながら、国の財政を強化し、国内食料価格を下げ、商工業の発展を促進する可能
性を有する。ただし、それは農民の犠牲の上に成り立つ政策であって、農民がそれを自覚
し、その不公正を是正するべく政治活動を組織するようになれば、政治家の利害計算にも
とづき放棄されざるをえない。かかる農民による反対運動が遅れれば、彼等は国民経済的
にも非効率であり、不公正の度合も高い収奪に甘んじることになろう。したがって本論文
のごとき研究を積み重ね、輸出税のごとき政策がどのような効果を経済効率と分配の公正
とに与えるかを明らかにするなら、過度の搾取から農民を守ることが可能になるのではな
かろうか。 
 
以上によって、審査委員会は、理論、歴史、計量の各面にわたる分析を通じて途上国の
開発政策に対して有意義な示唆を導いたものとして博士論文にふさわしい学問的業績であ
ると結論する。 
